WOULD-BE SOTA SCENARIO?
Selected Halachos from the “One Minute Halacha” project
By HaRav Yosef Yeshaya Braun, Shlita,
Mara D’asra and member of the Badatz of Crown Heights
WARNING YOUR WIFE
“I’m on my way to work,” the husband calls out to his wife, “That electrician is still working on the fuse box, so I’m leaving the door ajar. Remember not to close it until he leaves!” Ten minutes later, when morning traffic and a cool wind disturb her household tasks, the wife—forgetful of the stranger in the basement until he comes upstairs in a trail of dust—had locked the door.
The laws governing a Sota (wayward wife) state that a husband who wishes to implicate his wife in secluding herself with a stranger must first issue a kinui (warning) to her that she not put herself in a situation of stirah (solitude) with a particular man. A woman who nonetheless ignores her husband’s warning—which cannot be retracted, even by a forgiving husband, once stirah occurs—has but one recourse: she must drink the mei Sota (waters of the Sota—a special preparation by a Kohen in the Beis HaMikdash) before she is permitted to live again with her husband.
The laws of yichud (seclusion of a woman with a strange man or vice versa) would equally apply to any woman—married or not, even without a husband’s warning.* In most contemporary situations an innocent transgression would normally have no bearing on a marriage. However, an issue may arise innocuously when a husband advises his wife concerning yichud with any particular individual. What if the wife forgets her husband’s warning—such as in the above scenario where he reminded her to leave the door ajar so she is not home alone with the handyman, but she mistakenly closed the door? Has she inadvertently placed herself in the position of a would-be Sota? If that is the case, is she prohibited from continuing to live with her husband indefinitely since there is no mei Sota solution in current times?
Practically speaking, there are many reasons why the above scenario is not categorized within the strictures of a Sota; primarily, an unsuspecting husband’s “warning” is not offered with the intention of kinui, only as a friendly reminder about the laws of yichud. In addition, even when she admits to closing the door, her testimony would only be valid if her husband trusts her. However, the Beis Din cannot unconditionally accept a husband’s claim that he believes his wife, because it would be difficult to verify that he does not have an ulterior motive—such as using the situation as a reason to file for a get (Jewish bill of divorce).
A woman in this situation can simply refrain from verbalizing her mistake in closing the door, and would not be considered guilty of stirah—there are no witnesses (and no one is ever required to incriminate themselves in this manner). Even if she did admit to the yichud situation and her husband’s statement that he believes her that the door was closed would be accepted, she is still considered innocent of Sota-hood. She issues a statement that she remained faithful to her husband; by virtue of her admission to wrongdoing when she could easily have lied, she has ne’emanus(trustworthiness) or, alternatively, z’chus hata’anah (the right to argue [in her own] defense). On the strength of either of these grounds, her testimony is irrefutably accepted.
*It should be noted that in the case of kinui, the laws of stirah are much stricter than the normal parameters of yichud; exclusions such as ba’alah ba’ir (her husband is in town) or pesach pasuach (an open doorway [to the public]) do not apply.
WHEN A BRACHA ON FOOD MAY NOT COUNT
I should have realized a free chocolate bar would make problems… Now I’m stuck: I recited the bracha of shehakol, but as I was about to take a bite, I glanced at the package and instead of the usual hechsher, I see the small “not for individual sale” warning. So what do I do? I know a bracha l’vatalah (a blessing said in vain) is a biggie. And the chocolate might actually be kosher, if only I could have verified the kosher symbol on the big box this complimentary snack came in. Hashem’s holy name versus a possible issur* of kashrus: which lapse trumps the other?
The best option in this case is to reject the food—even spit out any unswallowed morsel—and say “Baruch shem k’vod malchuso l’olam va’ed” (Blessed be His honored Majesty’s Name forever and ever—a statement that is a form of apology for having uttered the Holy Name in vain). There are several reasons why saying “baruch shem…” is preferable to consuming the food in this situation: according to many opinions, this statement can actually rectify the transgression of saying Hashem’s name in vain, while eating something that might be not kosher has no such immediate fix. Additionally, it can be argued that the bracha isn’t considered l’vatalah, since at the time when the bracha was recited it was for a specific purpose—when the person recited it, they did not realize that the food might not be kosher.
Another facet of the dilemma rests on the food itself. If it is indeed non-kosher, we are actually forbidden—according to many opinions—to recite a bracha on it, so eating the food would not correct it in any case, and saying “baruch shem…” is the safer course. Finally, by making a decision to eat the food when its kosher status cannot be verified, the transgressor is actively committing a possible wrongdoing, while refraining from eating food on which a bracha was recited would at this point constitute—at most—a passive, unintended transgression.
* The rationale that holds true for the unmarked chocolate bar would equally apply to all levels of unconfirmed ma’acholos asuros (forbidden consumables) or any possible food contraventions, for example, making a bracha on a milchig (dairy) snack within six hours of eating fleishig (meat) or food or drink on a taanis tzibbur (public fast day).
A LAST-MINUTE MAARIV
It is a mitzvas aseh (a positive Biblical commandment) to recite the Shma both in the evening and in the morning. The ideal time for saying the evening Shma is during Maariv (the evening prayer); Shma and Maariv should be recited immediately after tzes hakochavim (nightfall, literally, when stars emerge)—halachically defined as the time when three kochavim ketanim (minor stars) are visible to the naked eye in the night sky.
A person who is delayed from reciting the evening Shma at the optimal time may still do so until chatzos halaylah (midnight; the sixth halachic hour after sunset). This deadline was established l’harchik adam min ha’aveirah (to spare a person from transgressing), to avoid a cavalier attitude toward the obligation to recite the Shma in its correct time.
However, b’dieved (post facto—i.e., chatzos has passed) a person may recite the Shma until alos hashachar (dawn, “the rising of the morning [sun’s rays]”), after which the time for reciting Maariv and the Shma has passed. Someone who is an annus (“forced”) due to unavoidable circumstances—for example, one who is too drunk to daven before alos hashachar—should nevertheless say the Shma and Maariv until netz hachamah (sunrise—when the sun is visible on the horizon). In this case, the t’filla (prayer) of Hashkivenu (“Put us to sleep…”) should not be said, since it is limited to the time when people normally go to sleep. There is also a machlokes haposkim (a halachic dispute) whether Shmoneh Esrei (the nineteen blessings [of the silent Amida]) of Maariv may be recited at this time.
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