HALACHIC HR
February 28, 2017
Beis Moshiach in #1059, Halacha 2 Go

Selected Halachos from the One Minute Halachaproject

By HaRav Yosef Yeshaya Braun, Shlita,
Mara Dasra and member of the Badatz of Crown Heights

WHO DECIDES THE GREY AREAS OF EMPLOYMENT?

The conditions of an employee’s salary, benefits or work requirements may become a matter of dispute when these matters were not clearly delineated in the original contract of employment. Halacha states that these issues are often settled based on minhag hamedinah (the local custom).

One aspect of minhag hamedinah includes matters of takana (regulation) and these become standard regardless of local adherence. But certain practices are only minhag shena’aseh mei’ailav (a developed custom) that became the common procedure only by default. In these matters too, halacha follows the universal minhag. Therefore, in areas of disagreement, it is considered as if the rules of minhag hamedinah (both those that result from legislation and those based on universal practice) were implied in the original terms of employment.

However, sometimes there arises an issue that is practiced only in the majority of cases. It is conventionally held as common practice—but not across the board. Should it still be the standard for terms of employment?

It may be argued that we should take into account the principle in halacha that states, “Ein holchin b’mamon achar harov” (we do not follow the majority in money matters). Accordingly, one of the parties might wish to argue, “I belong to the minority that follows different standards.” Many poskim nevertheless maintain that in the case of a contract established between parties for the future, we include matters that are practiced by the majority. These practices—even if they are not observed by every business in the vicinity—are also considered to have been determined the time of the contract.

INSIDE AND OUT THE PARAMETERS OF AN EIRUV

The malacha ([one of 39 types of prohibited] work) of hotza’ah (carrying) on Shabbos includes carrying mereshus l’reshus (from one [type of halachic] domain to another) or from one place to another within reshus harabim (the public domain [within or near a major thoroughfare]). In a reshus hayachid (private domain) we may carry unrestricted.

However, Shlomo HaMelech (the king, 10th century BCE) instituted the concept of an eiruv chatzeiros (mixed [ownership of] courtyards) for carrying from one reshus hayachid to another or in a common area between neighbors. While the common area is fenced in, and therefore a bona fide reshus hayachid, it can be confused with a reshus harabim, and would therefore be subject to restriction. Through the takana (institution) of an eiruv,* where the neighbors band together by sharing food, they essentially create one inclusive domain out of their individual residences.

There are many intricate laws regarding the parameters of such an eiruv between neighbors in a single building of separate apartments, those that share a common courtyard and private houses that border each other. In a very general summary, these are the three requirements for establishing an eiruv chatzeros:

Fenced In: Mechitzos (partitions)—physical demarcations of at least ten t’fachim (hand-breadths, a little less than a meter in total) high around the eiruv zone must be present. In areas where there is a pirtza (breach) in a wall or fence, it is sometimes possible to bridge the gap with a tzuras hapesach (a doorframe) constructed in accordance with specific criteria.

Mixed Crowd: If the eiruv zone includes a non-Jewish resident among two or more Jewish residents, sechiras reshus (rental of territory) from the non-Jewish residents must be arranged.

Honestly Open: Less known than the other criteria, there is a rule of accessibility on the shared properties of an eiruv zone. If there is a barrier of ten t’fachim or higher between courtyards to be included, a door or a window of at least four by four t’fachim (six feet by six feet) must allow access from one property to the next in order for the eiruv to be effective.

*The enclosures of tzuras hapesach—consisting of strings or cables hung between posts or poles—that are erected in urban areas categorized as karmelis (“semi-private” domain, i.e., a Rabbinically restricted area that is similar to reshus harabim) are more accurately termed mechitzos, although they are colloquially called “eiruv” too. The food-shares in urban areas, kept in a central location on behalf of all city residents, are usually referred to as shitufei mevo’os (associations of pathways) in contrast to eiruvei chatzeros—food shares for courtyards. Shitufei mevo’os were also instituted by Shlomo HaMelech and have similarities to eiruvei chatzeros, but their complex rules and parameters, as well as those of tzuras hapesach, are beyond the scope of this halacha.

A P’SAK ON PORTRAITURE

Chazal instituted certain guidelines relating to appropriate reading materials on Shabbos; one of these restrictions is reading the captions under tzuros udyukna’os (paintings or images—see Halacha #99), as is brought in the Gemara Shabbos. With regard to gazing at the dyukna (image) itself, the Gemara continues, this is forbidden even during the week, mishum shene’emar “al tifnu el ha’elilim” (on account of the verse [with the Torah prohibition] “Do not stray after idols”).

Quoting this Gemara, Rishonim, posit a range of issurim (prohibitions); each opinion is based on a different interpretation of the pasuk (verse). According to some authorities, this issur refers specifically to portraits that were created for the purpose of avoda zara (idol worship). Others state that the word elilim can also be interpreted as “inanities.” These poskim state that even an image or visage that is meant to serve only for decoration is restricted as it causes mefaneh libo l’vatalah (directing one’s heart towards emptiness), distracting a person from their main pursuit of avodas Hashem (service of G-d).

Nevertheless, halacha concludes that pictures and portraits that are not meant for avoda zara are not prohibited—and indeed people commonly view (and hang) innocuous pictures and portraits. Poskim add, however, that a yarei d’var Hashem (one who [particularly] fears the word of G-d) would refrain from gazing at these images, except in cases where there it brings to’eles (purpose) to their avodas Hashem.

The Gemara tells of Rav Menachem ben Rav Sima’i who earned the title of Benan shel K’doshim (son of holy [people]) due to his diligence in this particular matter—he never looked at the surface of a coin because of the image engraved on it. This anecdote indicates that “normal” people need not be scrupulous about this, say the commentaries. Even those poskim who restrict gazing at all images (including those that don’t represent avoda zara) would allow this, since the portraits on coins are so commonly at hand, they would not be the cause of distraction from Torah and mitzvos.

The Magen Avraham (17th century halachic commentator) states that even the poskim who include all images in the prohibition refer to contemplating the image and not just looking at a picture or portrait in passing.

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Article originally appeared on Beis Moshiach Magazine (http://www.beismoshiachmagazine.org/).
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